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Mahaffey: Torts/Sexual Harassment - Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: Wyoming

TORTS/SEXUAL HARASSMENT-Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: Wyoming Recognizes Workplace Sexual Misconduct as the Basis
for an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim. Kanzler v.
Renner, 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997)

INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 1995, Sharon Kanzler, a former dispatcher for the
Cheyenne Police Department, filed a claim in state district court alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from David Renner's inappropriate sexual advances.' Renner, a Cheyenne police officer, filed a
motion for summary judgment on January 10, 1996. The court granted the
motion on the grounds that Renner's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to present an issue to a jury., On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate under
the circumstances because Kanzler had presented sufficient evidence to
support her claim and, more significantly, that sexual misconduct within the
workplace can give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
Kanzler worked as a police dispatcher for the Cheyenne Police Department from July 12, 1982, through August 14, 1991.' During her employment, she met and befriended Renner., Kanzler claims that in March of
1991 Renner's behavior toward her drastically changed. Over the following
weeks, Renner made offensive and unwelcome advances, each act more
aggressive than the last.'
Kanzler alleges that during this period Renner followed her, intimidated her, touched her, and finally attacked her.7 Kanzler also claims that as
a result of Renner's actions she could no longer perform her job and was
forced to resign.' Ms. Kanzler began visiting a counselor who diagnosed her

1. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Wyo. 1997).
2. Id. at 1340-41.

3. Id. at 1341-42. Kanzler brought a previous suit in federal district court against the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming as well as against David Renner. The previous case stemmed from the same series of
events as the present case, but Ms. Kanzler claimed violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). See Ball v. City of
Cheyenne, Wyo., 845 F. Supp. 803 (D. Wyo. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ball v. Renner,

54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995). During the previous federal cases Ms. Kanzler went under the married
name of Ball.
4. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1339.
5. Brief for Appellant at 5, Kanzler, 937 P.2d 1337.
6. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1339.

7. Id. at 1339-40.
8. Id. at 1340.
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with post traumatic stress disorder associated with the work incidents.' As a
result of these events, Kanzler filed suit against Renner in Laramie County

District Court. This case eventually came before the Wyoming Supreme
Court under the name Kanzler v. Renner.'

This note will describe the basic tenets of sexual harassment jurisprudence, at intervals using the cases which have arisen from the events alleged
by Kanzler as illustrative examples. The analysis considers the significance
of the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Kanzler v. Renner within the
broader context of sexual harassment law." The note argues that the Kanzler

decision is important because it exposes individuals to personal liability for
sexual harassment. The analysis also describes the benefits and drawbacks

of using state tort law as a supplement or substitute for causes of action under federal antidiscrimination statutes.
BACKGROUND

Development ofLegal Actions Based Upon Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment claims are a relatively recent legal development, yet
they have had a tremendous impact on America's business and judicial
communities. One writer suggested, "sexual harassment is one of the most

significant labor issues of the 1980s," and there is no indication the subject

9. Id.
10. 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997). On June 14, 1991, Ms. Kanzler filed a charge of discrimination with
the Fair Employment Practices Division of the Wyoming Department of Employment and with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On November 27, 1992, the United States Department
of Justice issued a Notice of Right to Sue, which allowed Kanzler to bring suit in United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming. Ball, 845 F. Supp. at 807. For a brief summary of the EEOC procedure see JAMES W. HUNT, THE LAW OF THE WORKPLACE 71-73 (2d ed. 1988).
Kanzler filed suit against the City of Cheyenne and against David Renner in his individual and
official capacities. She claimed that both defendants had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and asserted that Renner was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ball, 845 F.
Supp. at 805-06. (Kanzler also claimed that the city had denied her equal protection under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and claimed that the city was liable under a public policy tort theory. The court rejected these
The City of Cheyenne moved for summary judgment, but the court held that issues of mateclaims. Id.)
rial fact precluded granting such a motion on Kanzler's Title VII claim. Id.at 810. Defendant Renner
also moved for sunmmary judgment as to all claims Kanzler asserted against him. The district court
granted Renner's motion. Id at 813-14. The City prevailed at a bench trial on May 18, 1994. Brief for
Appellant at 3, Kwnzler, 937 P.2d 1337.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Kanzler contested the
district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Renner. Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir.
1995). The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Kanzler's Title ViI claim against Renner, but
reversed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim-instead ordering that the
state tort law claim should be dismissed without prejudice so that it might be brought before a state
court Id.
at 664-65.
11. This note is devoted to the issue of workplace sexual harassment The separate issue of qualified
immunity for municipal employees will not be addressed here.
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has lost significance in the 1990s."
Early in this century, women seeking to recover for mental distress and
humiliation arising from illicit sexual advances would also need to establish
an underlying tort, such as assault and battery or trespass.'3 In 1976, however, the first Title VII sexual harassment case was decided." Following this
decision, plaintiffs began to bring successful actions under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state antidiscrimination laws."
Though plaintiffs may bring a sexual harassment claim exclusively under Title VII or a state civil rights statute, employees who feel they have
been sexually harassed often add a pendent tort claim, or proceed with a suit
based solely under one or more theories of tort liability."' Frequently used
tort theories include: negligent retention, negligent failure to supervise and
train managers, defamation, infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of
7
privacy, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution.
Sexual HarassmentClaims Under Title VII: Quid Pro Quo andHostile Environment
Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 as a form of sex discrimination." The Act makes it unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."" Case law, EEOC
guidelines, and several important Supreme Court cases have fleshed out
what kind of employment practices violate Title VII.

12. Arthur J. Marinelli, Jr., Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 20 AKRON L.
REV. 375 (1987). Marinelli and other commentators cite an influential definition of sexual harassment
offered in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, 1 (1979). Sexual
harassment is defined therein as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power." Id.
13. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1055 (1936).
14. Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Primer, 29
AKRON L. REv. 269, 270 (1996). The first sexual harassment case decided under Title VII was Williams
v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other groundssub nom. Williams v. Belle, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15. RONALD M. GREEN & RICHARD J. REIBSTEIN, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO WORKPLACE TORTS 201
(1992). Because state antidiscrimination laws are predominantly modeled after federal antidiscrimination
laws and interpreted like their federal counterparts, this note focuses on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
16. Id. at 201.
17. Id. at 201-04. The authors provide a concise description of each tort theory within the sexual
harassment/workplace context.
IS. See generaly Marinelli, supra note 12, for a complete discussion of the early case law in which
various courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court, came to recognize sexual harassment as an actionable form
of sex discrimination under Title VII.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(l) (1988) (emphasis added).
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From these sources, two basic categories of sexual harassment have
emerged, each reflecting a different factual situation. The two categories are
1) quid pro quo, and 2) hostile environment."0 Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a manager or supervisor makes an employee's terms or privileges
of employment, such as wages or advancement, contingent upon that employee's submission to sexual advances or demands.'
In the early 1980s, courts began to recognize what they called an "abusive" or "hostile" work environment as a form of sex discrimination that
violated Title V11.1 The United States Supreme Court endorsed this view in
the watershed case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinsonn In Meritor, the Court
held that even absent an "economic" or "tangible" quid pro quo, unwelcome
and inappropriate sexual behavior could constitute prohibited sexual harassment where, "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."'" As the Court carefully
pointed out, however, "for sexual harassment to be actionable it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.""
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of what a plaintiff must show to
establish actionable hostile work environment harassment in Harris v.
Forklift Systems.,, In Harris, the Court expanded the holding in Meritor,
explaining that Title VII can be violated without actual psychological injury
to the victim, so long as an environment would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." Thus, after Harris,the plaintiff has
a twofold burden to demonstrate a hostile work environment. First, she must
show that a reasonable person would find the environment hostile or abusive. Second, the plaintiff must show a subjective perception that the envi-

20. ALFRED G. FELIu, PRIMER ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 239 (2d ed. 1996).
21. Id. at 243.

22. Roberts & Mann, supra note 14, at 276. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981). Courts adopted this position in part because of deference given to EEOC guidelines promulgated
in 1980. Marinelli, supra note 12, at 375. The EEOC guidelines provided that "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" may constitute sexual harassment, a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (1985).
23. 47 U.S. 57 (1986).
24. Id. at 65.
25. Id. at 67.

26. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Prior to the Harris decision there was a split among the Circuits regarding
whether harassment must seriously affect the victim's psychological well being. Another unsettled issue
was whether courts should assess the abusive work environment by the standard of a reasonable person
or of a reasonable woman. Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986),
with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
27. Harris,510 U.S. at22.
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ronment was abusive."
The Harris court noted that lower courts should weigh all the circumstances when determining whether an environment is hostile. Harrisalso set
forth specific factors lower courts may consider when reviewing sexual
harassment claims.2' By allowing courts to consider the victim's psychological damage as an indication of an abusive environment, rather than as a
prerequisite to recovery," the overall result of the Harrisdecision was to
make it easier for victims to make a prima facie showing in lawsuits using a
hostile work environment as grounds for the action."
A recent Supreme Court case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., resolved the issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment could violate Title VII.Y The Court unanimously held that it could, but that the plaintiff must "always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with
offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discriminat[ion]...
because of sex."" 1 The Court also reaffirmed the Harrisstandard. The applicable standard in determining whether a work environment is objectively
hostile is that of a reasonableperson14
In order to recover for either quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment, the plaintiff must further show that the alleged harassment occurred and that the conduct was unwelcome. In order to establish that the
conduct was unwelcome, courts will consider whether or not the plaintiff
complained about the conduct either informally or through a formal procedure, or otherwise indicated the conduct was offensive."

28. Roberts & Mann, supra note 14, at 280. However, another writer has described how confusion
regarding the application of the objective/subjective standard has survived in cases following Harris.
She also argues that Harris did not definitively end the debate as to whether harassment should be
judged by a "reasonable woman" standard, or by a "reasonable person" standard. See Sarah E. Bums,
Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Worlplace, What Is Itand How Should ItBe Assessed After Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1994-95).
29. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The Court held that the following factors are proper considerations:
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, severity of the conduct; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance. Id.
30. Id.
31. Bums, supra note 28, at 398-99. Burns argues that Harris corrects former anomalies in the case
law which were contradictory to the goals of Tile VII.
32. 118S.Ct.998(1998).
concurring).
33. Id at 1002 (Ginsburg, J.,
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. FELiU, supranote 20,at 223.
36. Id. at 242. This evidence will not always be present, especially if the employee fears the repercussions of lodging such a complaint, Id. at 241-43.
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Who May Be HeldLiablefor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII
A.

Employer Liability

Title VII forbids discrimination on the part of employers. 7 The Act defines the term "employer" as, "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees.., and any agent of such a
person."" The phrase "and any agent" within the statute has given rise to
debate over whether Congress intended the Act to impose liability only on
employers, or also on individuals?,
In the case of quid pro quo harassment, courts have held that the employer is vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisory employee, even
if the employer had no knowledge of the harassment, under the theory of
respondeat superior.' When a victim alleges hostile environment harassment, however, the employer may not be liable for the actions of an employee unless the employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment,
or the employer failed to take remedial measures with regard to harassment
about which it should have known."
In Meritor, the Supreme Court suggested that courts should look to
agency principles for guidance in determining employer liability under Title
VII."1 According to agency principles, an employer is liable for harassment
by an employee when the employee acts within the scope of his authority,
or when the employee has apparent authority and there is reliance on that
authority by another."1 Thus, the Meritor decision makes clear there are
limitations on employer liability for the acts of its employees, but the decision provided limited guidance to lower courts."
B.

Individual Liability: Supervisors and Co-Workers

The most controversial hostile environment cases have been those in
which plaintiffs assert claims against supervisors and co-workers. In these
cases, the issue is whether or not Title VII imposes liability on individuals,
37. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
39. Robert Lukens, Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassmentand Individual Liability, 69 TEMP. L,
REV. 303, 313 (1996).
40. Roberts & Mann, supra note 14, at 275. A case argued before the Supreme Court in spring 1998
could give the Court the opportunity to clarify employer liability for actions of supervisory employees.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, I ll F.3d 1530 (1 Ith Cir. .1997), cert. granted,118 S. Ct 438 (U.S. Nov.
14, 1997) (No. 97-282).
41. 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights § 387 (1991 & Supp. 1997).
42. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
43. 14A C.J.S. § 387.
44. Meritor,477 U.S. at 72. The Court suggested the limitations on employer liability are correlated
with the actual supervisory authority of the employee whose conduct is in question.
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not whether liability should be transferred to the employer. The circuit
courts have interpreted the term "agent" in the statute in two basic ways:
One holds individuals liable under Title VII while the other does not.45 First,
some courts have viewed the term "agent" as deepening the pool of potential defendants under Title VII to include supervisory and management personnel who discriminate in the workplace."' Second, other courts view the
term as merely broadening the circumstances in which corporations and
other organizational "employers," as defined by the statute, may be liable
for imputed acts of individuals."
In Ball v. Renner, the Tenth Circuit adopted the approach that an individual must exercise supervisory or managerial authority over the victim to
be liable as an "employer" under Title VII." The court of appeals stated that
in order to hold agents liable as if they were employers, "those agents must
be the equivalent or near-equivalent of true employers: Persons who exercise employer-like functions vis-a-vis the employees who complain of those
persons' unlawful conduct.""
Alternatively, there is a persuasive argument that Congress did not intend Title VII to create any individual liability." As the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated in Miller v. Maxwell's, "the obvious purpose of this
[agent] provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the
statute.",, The Miller court and others also considered the Title VII statutory
scheme itself as an indicator that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees. 2
State TortLaw Claims
The tort considered by many to be best suited to application in the sexual harassment context is intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 In
45. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit accurately described the state of the law in Ball v.
Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Lukens, supra note 39, at 316-24. Compare Paroline
v. Unysis Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), with Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this circuit split.
46. Ball, 54 F.3d at 666.
47. Id,
48. Id. at 668.
49. Id. The court concluded that Renner was not liable as an employer under Title VII because there
was no proof he exercised any supervisory authority over Kanzlcr.
50. See Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), and Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21
F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
51. 991 F.2dat 587.
52. Id To support this conclusion, courts look to the congressional decision to define "employers" as
having at least fifteen employees, so as to protect small entities from the cost of litigating discrimination
claims. Id
53. Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability
Should Be Curtailed,20 CONN. L. REv. 375, 404 (1998). For a brief outline of other tort theories that
have been advanced in sexual harassment claims, see generally Krista J.Schoenheider, Comment, A
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most states the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
three elements: the conduct must 1)be extreme and outrageous; 2) be intentional or reckless; and 3) cause severe emotional distress.4
Many states, including Wyoming, have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation of the tort, including the influential definition of
"extreme and outrageous" conduct contained in section 46, comment d.15
Comment d defines outrageous conduct as conduct which goes "beyond all
possible bounds of decency," and is "to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."'' It further states, "liability does not
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,

and other trivialities."'
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has, however,
been difficult for courts to apply with uniformity." Courts that adhere to the
Restatement formulation of intentional infliction of emotional distress are
faced with the dilemma of giving meaning to the phrase "extreme and outrageous conduct." 9 Defining this phrase has proven to be quite a challenge.
In the words of the Restatement, "the liability clearly does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities."' 0 Beyond these rudimentary guidelines, however, courts are left
to sort out on a case by case basis what type of conduct qualifies as outrageous.

61

Theory of Tort Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1986). See
also Joseph J.Ortego and Kevin McElroy, A Sexual Harassment Primer,Vol. 43-No.3 PRAC. LAW. 49,
at 54-56 (1996); and GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 15, at 201-06.
54. Ortego & McElroy, supra note 53, at 54.
55. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 1997). The court first adopted the Restatement
formulation of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Leithead v. American Colloid Co.,
721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT CAUSING

SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESs § 46(1) (1965), reads as follows: "One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt d.
57. Id.
58. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness
IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982).
When the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the tort, it noted that 37 jurisdictions had also done so by
1977, and stated, "The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as described in § 46 of the
Restatement can be safely characterized as the general rule in the United States." Leithead, 721 P.2d at
1066.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1).

60. Id. § 46, cmt. d. The Restatement further provides, "liability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency and to be regaraed as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
61. Givelber, supra note 58, at 42. Givelber states, "the term 'outrageous' is neither value free nor
exacting. It does not objectively describe an act or series of acts; rather, it represents an evaluation of
behavior." Id. at 51. He concludes, "there is little evidence that this tort will ever provide the basis for
principled adjudication, it has provided and probably will continue to provide the basis for achieving
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In Leithead v. American Colloid,the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as a valid cause of action
while simultaneously circumscribing its limitations." Later decisions reflect
the court's continued uncertainty regarding what is to be considered extreme and outrageous conduct. In Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of
Commerce, for instance, the court divided over which of the plaintiff's
claims presented sufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct and
which did not.6'
In Garciav. Lawson the court again divided over a determination of
whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of outrageous conduct." The majority in Garcia viewed the alleged conduct as irresponsible,
unprofessional, and insensitive, but not sufficient to satisfy the strict requirements of the Restatement.6 The dissenters, in contrast, believed the
plaintiff had presented evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct that
could be presented to a jury, and criticized the majority for never expounding a standard by which conduct can be evaluated."
Some jurisdictions have held that when sexual harassment is alleged as
the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the harassing behavior alone does not rise to the requisite level of outrageousness
to make out a cause of action.' Instead, these jurisdictions require the plain-

situational justice." Id. at 75.
62. 721 P.2d at 1064-68. The Leithead court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but also held that theplaintiff had not produced evidence of severe emotional distress sufficient
to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
63. 68 P.2d 211, 223 (Wyo. 1994). The plaintiff in Wilder alleged he had been reprimanded by his
employer, had his pay reduced, and was required to publicly accept responsibility for financial problems
of the employer. The plaintiff's employment was terminated, although the employer had not completed a
formal investigation and the plaintiff had denied responsibility for any financial problems. The employer
also, on at least two occasions, aggressively interfered with other employment opportunities for the
plaintiff. The majority held that the employer's conduct in these instances could be construed as sufficiently outrageous for purposes of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 223-24. Following
remand, the issue of damages was appealed as Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 933 P.2d
1098 (Wyo. 1997) (Wilder]]).
64. 928 P.2d 1164 (Wyo. 1996). In the Garcia case, the plaintiff was the victim of a sexual assault,
and the defendant was the investigating police officer. The plaintiff alleged that the officer had conducted a poor investigation of the rape and, in response to her account of the attack, had told her he
could not do anything since the assailant was the plaintiffs boyfriend, remarked on the size of a mutual
acquaintance's breasts, and had the audacity to invite the plaintiff out for a drink.
65. Id. at 1167.
66. Id. at 1169 (Golden, J., dissenting, Lehman, J., joining). One commentator asserts that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress works in exactly that manner: Courts conduct a case by case
factual consideration, where the elements of the tort are essentially reduced into a single element-the
outrageousness of the conduct in question. Givelber, supra note 58, at 46. Givelber also argues that proof
a defendant behaved outrageously often provides evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim that the emotional distress was severe. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 12, at 57 (5th ed. 1984) (supporting the proposition that flagrant conduct can add weight to the
plaintiff's claim that the mental distress suffered is genuine and serious).
67. Ortego & McElroy, supra note 53, at 55. The authors cite Andrews v. Philadelphia,895 F.2d

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1998

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 33 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIII

tiff to show harassment "plus" something more. In a Third Circuit decision,
for example, the court said, "the extra factor that is generally required is
retaliation for turning down sexual propositions."'"
PRINCIPAL CASE

The Wyoming Supreme Court began its decision in Kanzler v. Renner
with an account of the facts alleged in the case. The facts include an instance in which Renner followed Kanzler as she drove home from work.69
Renner also made frequent visits to the radio room where Kanzler worked,
and stared at her for extended periods as she attempted to perform her job."
On one occasion, Renner approached her, pulled her toward him, and began
to slow dance with her. She pushed him away and told him to leave her
alone.,, Finally, Renner attacked Kanzler on May 1, 1991, in a utility closet
in the dispatch room. Renner followed7 Kanzler into the closet, closed the
door, and attempted to detain her there. 1
The day after the attack, she reported the incidents to her superiors, and
they agreed she should not work for several days. She returned to work her
regular shift on May 6, but became emotionally distraught and left early,
fearful that she would encounter Renner." Kanzler began seeing a counselor
and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and depression in
connection with the events at work." Kanzler resigned August 14, 1991 ."
Because Wyoming has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
scheme for dealing with the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court utilized the Restatement as a fundamental part of its analysis.
The court referred to Restatement section 46 comments h and j.76 Under
these guidelines, the court, initially determines the outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct and the severity of the plaintiff's emotional distress."
1469 (3d Cir. 1990) in support of their conclusion that in the sexual harassment context a plaintiff will

generally need to make out more than the harassment alone to recover under intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
68. Andrews, 895 F2d at 1487.
69. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Wyo. 1997). Kanzler alleged a series of incidents in
which Renner either followed her, or was seen parked near her home in the early morning hours alter her
shift ended. See also Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 665 (10th Cir. 1995).
70. Kanz/er, 937 P.2d at 1339.
71. Id. Kanzler also alleges another occasion where, in the presence of another officer, Renner put
his arm around her and pulled her toward him. In response, she hit his arm away, said "don't," and fled
the room. She also claims that Renner behaved intrusively regarding her relationship with officer Greg
Ball.
72. Id. at 1339-40.
73. Id. at 1340.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 cmt h reads:

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol33/iss2/10

10

Mahaffey: Torts/Sexual Harassment - Extreme and Outrageous Conduct: Wyoming
1998

CASE NOTES

The court also consulted section 46 comment d of the Restatement in order

to establish a working definition of "extreme and outrageous" conduct.7
In two previous decisions the court had recognized that certain conduct
within the employment context may rise to a level of outrageousness sufficient to provide a basis upon which a plaintiff could recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.71 In Kanzler, however, the court

expressly held that "inappropriate sexual conduct within the workplace can,
upon sufficient evidence, give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress."'

Another important part of the court's decision was an examination of
other intentional infliction of emotional distress cases based on charges of
workplace sexual misconduct.' The court approvingly cited a Utah Supreme
Court opinion on the subject of a general policy toward sexual harassment.u

The cited language suggests society has ceased to see sexual harassment in
the workplace as a frivolous occurrence, and instead sees sexual harassment
as a "corrosive" element in the workplace that has more to do with the abusive exercise of power than with sexual play. 3
Though the court considered a wide array of decisions, it never expressly adopted a harassment "plus" test, as have other jurisdictions. The
court did, however, discern several recurring factors other courts use to assist in the determination of whether particular workplace conduct qualifies
Court and Jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or
whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to
the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
Comment j. reads in part:
Severe emotional distress... Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental
suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like ....It is only where it is
extreme that liability arises.. . It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe
emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it
has in fact existed.
78. See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
79. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1341. The previous decisions in which the court indicated outrageous conduct might occur within the employment context were Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059
Wyo. 1986), and Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994).
80. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1341-42 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1342 n2. One decision presumed sexual harassment in the workplace is by its very nature
outrageous. Another required that a claim of outrageous conduct in the employment context include
sexual harassment plus some sort of retaliation. The cases, respectively, are: Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, 858 (1989), and Lang v. Seiko Instrument USA,
Inc., No. 96-5398, 1997 WL 11301 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 1997).
82. Id. at 1342. The Wyoming Supreme Court cites Retheford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992). Retheford had been emphasized in the appellant's brief
and cited previously by the Wyoming Supreme Court. See Brief for Appellant at 20-21, Kanzler, 937
P.2d 1337; and Wilder, 868 P.2d at 224.
83. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1342.
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as sufficiently outrageous to present a jury question." The factors are: 1)
abuse of power, 2) repeated incidents/pattern of harassment, 3) unwelcome
touching/offensive, non-negligible physical contact, and 4) retaliation for
refusing or reporting sexually motivated advances."
Since Kanzler's allegations fell under the rubric of at least two of the
above factors, the court concluded that reasonable persons could differ in
their conclusions whether Renner's conduct was extreme and outrageous."
Thus, the court held it was appropriate for a jury to consider the question of
whether Renner's conduct rendered him liable to Kanzler."
The court completed its tort analysis by focusing its attention on the
second element of the tort, whether the plaintiff had suffered emotional distress." The court found that Kanzler's allegations that she suffered from
serious psychological maladies as a consequence of harassment, allegations
supported by the diagnoses of three independent health professionals as well
as her own testimony, constituted evidence sufficient to create a jury issue
on the severity of her emotional distress."
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Kanzler v. Renner acknowledges the seriousness of sexual harassment within the workplace and
recognizes that such conduct can result in compensable injury." The Kanzler decision, however, does little, if anything, toward expanding what type
of workplace misconduct will result in liability for sexual harassment. This
is because the criteria by which conduct is to be judged parallel the criteria
which already exist under Title VII and traditional tort law. Nor does the
decision affect the type of remedy available to victims of sexual
harassment."

84. Id at 1343.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court found that Kanzler alleged a series of repeated incidents in which Renner followed
her, stared at her, and subjected her to sexual advances and physically intimidating behavior. In addition
she alleged unwelcome non-negligible physical contact on the part of Renner, contact she repeatedly
communicated was unacceptable.
87. Id.
88. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j. (1965) reads in part: "[Emotional distress)
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment,worry, and nausea." The Restatement cmt j. also requires that
the emotional distress be "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."
89. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1343-44.
90. Id. at 1341-42. The Wyoming Supreme Court cites with approval strong language from a Utah
Supreme Court decision which emphasizes how the judicial system must reach decisions in conformity
with the wider societal view of sexual harassment as a serious problem.
91. Roberts & Mann, supra note 14, at 273. Prior to 1991, the remedies available under Title VII for
victims of sexual harassment were limited to back pay, lost wages, and reinstatement in the former job.
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Thus, the most significant result of the Kanzler decision is not the type
of conduct recognized as tortious, but who may be held liable for that conduct. Title VII, with its emphasis on employer discrimination, is often criticized as an unsatisfactory avenue of recovery when the acting person cannot
be characterized as an employer or an agent within the statute.' 2 Title VII,
therefore, is viewed as inadequate protection from harassment by a coemployee, business patron, or a small employer that does not meet the fifteen employee statutory requirement." Tort theories, such as the one utilized
in Kanzler, provide a supplemental judicial tool necessary to render liable a
segment of the workforce that could otherwise discriminate without repercussion.
Supplementation is necessary to accomplish several basic objectives.
First, by expanding the class of people potentially liable for sexual misconduct, the likelihood increases that a victim of such conduct will be fully
compensated. Next, holding individuals and employers alike liable for their
own workplace misconduct is consistent with a policy of distributing liability in accordance with culpability." Lastly, imposing individual liability
under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress provides a
remedy to an important subset of cases where an individual in the work environment has engaged in egregious conduct, but where the employer cannot properly be held responsible."
Of course, any expansion in liability comes with attendant concerns. A
common argument against intentional infliction of emotional distress as a
cause of action is that it could potentially flood the courts with fraudulent
claims and would greatly expand liability for every type of mental disturbance. Another argument against the tort is that it is too vague to apply. In
the words of one commentator, "the tort of intentional infliction of emoCongress amended Title VII in 1991, allowing victims of sexual harassment to recover compensatory
damages beyond back pay, futuRe pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, other nonpecuniary losses, and, under limited circumstances, punitive
damages. Id. The amendments also secured the right to a jury trial. Id The amendments changed the
Title VII remedial scheme to such a degree that many former criticisms are rendered void. See Schoenheider, supranote 53, at 1474-75.
92. Lukens, supra note 39, at 316. Lukens points out that courts are divided not only on whether
non-supervisory employees can be individually liable under Title VII, but on whether there should be
any individual liability under Title VII. Lukens argues that the statutory language and Congressional
intent to eradicate discrimination in the workplace weigh in favor of using agency principles to hold
individual defendants and their employers jointly and severally liable. id at 308-09.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1994).
94. Hager, supra note 53, at 392-93. Hager's thesis is that in hostile environment cases where the
conduct alleged is in the nature of a sexual overture, rather than a pervasive discriminatory environment,
Title VII should not apply. He argues that the damage inflicted in this situation is less akin to discrimination than to a personal intrusion, and that tort law provides the appropriate remedy. Id. at 379-85.
95. Marinelli, supra note 12, at 388.
96. Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 1986). See also KEETON ET AL.,
supranote 66, at 57-65.
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tional distress by outrageous conduct differs from traditional intentional
torts in an important respect: it provides no clear definition of the prohibited
conduct."'9 The following discussion will address these concerns.
The Substance of the Kanzler Guidelines
The type of conduct designated as tortious in Kanzler is quite similar to
conduct already prohibited under Title VII and traditional tort law. Thus,
Kanzler does not mark a departure from existing law in terms of what conduct is prohibited. The following section explains the similarities between
the factors set forth in Kanzler and pre-existing law.
A.

Abuse of Power

The Kanzler court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
46 for its definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Restatement indicates that conduct may be rendered outrageous because an
actor abuses a situation in which he and another person are in positions of
unequal power." In recognizing such behavior as outrageous, the court is in
solid accord not only with the Restatement, but also with the very origins
and early development of the tort."
Abuse of a position of power is also one of the conceptual foundations
of liability for sexual harassment under Title VII. Quid pro quo harassment
incorporates the idea of a person in a position of power over the employee
in combination with an improper threat or action.' Furthermore, hostile
environment claims are buttressed when it can be shown that a person of
authority was either complicit in the harassment, or took inadequate measures to discover or remedy harassment."'
B.

Repeated Incidents/Pattern of Harassment

The Wyoming Supreme Court found persuasive the position taken in
the Massachusetts case, Boyle v. Wenk.'02 In that case, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that incidents in a series are appropriately con97. Givelber, supra note 58, at 51. Justice Thomas's concurrence in Kanzler reflected this sentiment
He urged the court to take particular care in clarifying the boundaries of such a "volatile tort." Kanzler v.
Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1338 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring specially).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. e. (1965), reads in part: "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the
other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests."
99. See KEETON ET AL., supranote 66, at 57-65.
100. Schoenheider, supra note 53, at 1463.
101. See 14ACJ.S. § 387 (1991 & Supp. 1997).
102. 392 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1979). This case involved a series of phone calls and visits made by the
defendant to the home of the plaintiff in the course of investigating the plaintiff's brother in law. The
defendant engaged in various intimidating tactics, including calling the home at I a.m.
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sidered in their totality, and that repeated harassment may increase the outrageousness of isolated incidents which otherwise would not result in liability

"

'

Boyle, like Kanzler, involved unwelcome interaction between indi-

viduals.' °' In both cases, as in some Title VII cases, a significant fact arises
from the series of incidents; that is, the victim was able to express discontent with the harasser's actions and request that they stop."",
A series of incidents is frequently used by a plaintiff who attempts to
demonstrate a pervasive hostile environment. Hostile environment claims
focus on the atmosphere at the place of employment."" When a court tests
for a discriminatory work atmosphere, a relevant part of the inquiry is the
persistance of the conduct, the number of instances, and the totality of the
circumstances in which the harassment occured.r
C. Unwelcome Touching/Offensive Non-negligible Physical Contact
In support of this criteria the court cites Bryant v. Better Business Bureau of GreaterMd., Inc.-u The Bryant court concluded that there is something fundamentally outrageous about touching a woman in such a way as
to penetrate her clothing or touching areas of the woman's body which are
ordinarily taboo to anyone other than a physician or consensual sexual partner.""9 The Bryant court had no trouble characterizing such behavior as "beyond all possible bounds of decency.""'
This factor obviously resembles the tort of battery. The Restatement
Second of Torts states that an actor is liable for battery if he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person and such contact results."' The Restatement defines a bodily contact as offensive if, "it
offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity."' 2 Likewise, the Bryant
court made clear that the kind of touching considered inherently outrageous
entails something beyond casual touching.",

at 1055-56.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1056.

105. The reader will recall that in order to make a prima facie showing of sexual harassment under
Title VII, the plaintiffmust show that the conduct was unwelcome. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
106. FELIU, supra note 20, at 244.
107. Id
108. 923 F. Supp. 720 (D.Md. 1996). This case involved a defendant who had, against the will of the
plaintiff, kissed her on the lips, hugged her, fondled her breasts, slid his hand beneath her bra on more
than one occasion, and slid his hand under her skirt on several occasions.

at 748.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).

112. Id. § 19.
113. Bryant, 923 F. Supp. at 746-47. The Bryant court distinguished another case in which it was held

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1998

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 33 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIII

D. Retaliation for Refusing or Reporting Sexually-motivated Advances.

Here the forbidden activity is akin to quid pro quo harassment actionable under federal law. The court cites Shaffer v. NationalCan Corporation
as an illustrative case.'"4 The Shaffer court states that a certain level of repulsive behavior, including verbal 'propositioning,' and even solicitation for
prostitution, will not be actionable under the civil law.",
Like Title VII, however, the Shaffer court draws the line between punishable and merely aberrant behavior when an actor in a position of authority attempts to induce behavior on the part of the recipient.'"6 Actual retaliatory action on the part of the actor will serve to elevate the behavior beyond
the realm of insults or demeaning jokes. 7 It is apparent that often an inquiry
into whether inappropriate retaliatory action has occurred will be difficult to
divorce from an inquiry into whether the actor has abused a position of
power.
Sufficiency of the Action
Any attempt to allocate legal responsibility for an act necessarily goes
beyond defining a category of impermissible conduct to reasonably define a
category of persons who are to be liable. Congress designed Title VII liability with limitations in mind. For this reason a majority of courts have begun
to bar individual liability under Title VII in complaints of sexual harassment."' Likewise, when state courts venture into the business of applying
tort liability in the workplace, they consider who they want to hold liable.
In the Kanzler decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court discussed its
view of the term "sexual harassment." The court viewed the term as defining something broader than Title VII sexual harassment, including a wide
variety of both physical and verbal conduct." 9 Yet, as discussed above, the
court adhered to traditional concepts of what constitutes culpable conduct.
Kanzler is broader than federal law because it allows the plaintiff to proceed
against an individual who does not fall within the definition of "employer"

that the defendant's conduct was not sufficient to result in liability. The defendant had rubbed the plaintifFs back, kissed, and squeezed her againsther will.
114. 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The case involves a continued course of harassment in which
the defendant insinuated the plaintiffs job might be in jeopardy of she did not comply with his requests
for sexual favors. He eventually retaliated against her rejection of his advances by excluding her from
company activities and treating her with disdain before other employees.
115. Id. at916.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Lukens, supranote 39, at 305.
119. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 1997).
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under Title VII.
One commentator has suggested that Title VII, even supplemented by
state tort law claims, fails to adequately redress harm that should be compensable for workplace sexual harassment.2' The same commentator argues
that, while traditional tort law is inadequate to deal with workplace sexual
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress is potentially the
most successful ground on which a victim can recover for mental harm.1
The commentator contends that intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims depend on the ill-defined notion of outrageous conduct, and that judicial decisions are inconsistent on the subject of how sexual harassment
falls within the overall rubric of conduct.2z The conclusion is that a 3 new
independent theory of tort liability is necessary to resolve the problem.1
Another commentator argues that Title VII liability for hostile environment claims should be curtailed'1 Tort liability should fulfill the critical
role of fashioning a remedy for sexual harassment claims."' The commentator views the current formulation of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress as too restrictive to provide complete legal treatment of
the issue of sexual harassment. Consequently, stringent adherence 6to the
standards of "outrageousness" and "severe" harm should be relaxedY.
The above mentioned commentators focus on fashioning a legal remedy which would apply to a broad range of conduct under the heading of
sexual harrassment. Each proposes sweeping personal and vicarious liability
under tort law. The Kanzler decision takes a moderate approach to resolving
some of these problems. The factors identified in Kanzler provide needed
clarity to the Restatement formulation of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as applied to sexual harassment.'17 Yet, instead of relaxing existing
standards of evaluating conduct and damages, the court simply allowed an
action in tort against an individual where none had been allowed under Title
VII.
For this reason, the decision could go a long way toward making the

120. Schoenheider, supra note 53, at 1463. This article's analysis predates 1991 amendments to Title
VII allowing for punitive and compensatory damages.
121. Id. at 1481.
122. Id. at 1481, 1483.
123. Id. at 1485. Schoenheider proposes a new tort entitled "Sexual Harassment in the Workplace."
124. Hager, supranote 53, at 375.
125. Id. at 324. Hager stops short of endorsing a new independent tort theory. Id.
126. Id. Hager states, "Severity of distress would then stand as an index of damages but not as a
threshold to actionability ... Punishment and deterrence, not compensation, is the true soul of a legal
policy against harassment." Id. at 433 -34.
127. It is doubtful whether any new theory of tort liability or statutory cause of action could more
clearly define sexual harassment, but would simply alter the standard by which conduct is judged.
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tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress a satisfactory route by
which victims who have been harmed by sexual harassment can recover
against a particular harasser. On the other hand, the decision utilizes a stringent and traditional formulation of intentional infliction of emotional distress, thereby discouraging groundless claims and an undue increase in personal tort liability. The court has wisely avoided sacrificing reasonable restrictions on tort liability at the altar of a developing social policy against
sexual harassment.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Kanzler v. Renner marks
an important milestone in the development of a remedy for sexual harassment in Wyoming. Underlying the decision is an understanding that traditional tort law may need to augment other avenues of recovery, such as Title
VII, if victims of workplace sexual harassment are to have their damages
redressed. In particular, by making individuals liable for workplace sexual
harassment, Kanzler provides a solution for certain deficiencies that exist
under Title VII.
By adhering closely to existing theories of liability, such as Title VII
and traditional tort theories, the Kanzler court does not unnecessarily
broaden the spectrum of conduct for which responsibility will lie. The Kanzler decision insures that the harm caused is serious and the conduct objectively repugnant. Furthermore, though open to debate, the decision provides
necessary guidance to attorneys and district courts as to what constitutes
outrageous conduct within the context of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
CLAY MAHAFFEY
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